Shangri-La Dialogue: Ukraine War and Lessons for China


Chinese Defence Minister Gen. Li Shangfu, Credit: abc.net.au

Looks like the authors of the IISS annual report simply bought the Chinese narrative on the potential lessons the Ukraine war could have for China just as the latter wanted the others to believe.

Even as detailed analyses and assessments on the deliberations at the Shangri-La Dialogue 2023 organised by the Institute of International Strategic Studies (IISS) in Singapore are still awaited as the event will conclude only later today (June 4), a quick look at what transpired so far may be of interest. As expected, the proceedings so far witnessed assertions of their stated positions by the United States and China that included criticisms of the policies and actions by either side. Both sides used strong words while criticising the other without taking each other’s names, but chose to be a little more circumspect while referring to/addressing the other directly. But, let’s keep the examination of the choice of words, syntaxes used, subtle and deliberate body languages observed etc. for a detailed analysis when more facts are available.

IISS’s annual report and China’s potential Taiwan invasion

The main focus of the deliberations appeared to be Ukraine war and its implications for the Indo-Pacific, China’s assertiveness in South China Sea, U.S. role in the Indo- Pacific, freedom of navigation, the ‘devastating effect’ a potential conflict between the U.S. and China could have on the region and beyond, and more importantly, lessons for China from the Ukraine war from the perspective of the Taiwan issue. Those who got an opportunity to take a quick look at IISS’s annual report called “Asia Pacific Regional Security Assessment” say that it assesses the “faltering Russian war in Ukraine” does not change the way China might have planned its potential takeover of Taiwan by using force. It claims that China assesses Russia’s Ukraine war and China’s potential takeover of Taiwan would be “utterly dissimilar” in their planning and execution. However, some assessments by regional analysts on the subject available in the open domain this research team could access has a different view on the matter. Based on that, it could be said that those who wrote the IISS report believe China actually assesses the Ukraine war provides it no lessons from a Taiwan perspective. Probably, the authors simply bought the Chinese narrative which the Chinese side wanted the others to believe in?

According to the said assessments by regional analysts, the primary lesson China has learnt from the Ukraine war is that any potential invasion of Taiwan should achieve its objectives swiftly, i.e., within a few hours to maximum a couple of days. The use of barrages of missiles, rockets, drones, cyber attacks etc. would target Taiwan’s strategic sites in a concerted action lasting a few hours to a couple of days. At the same time, PLA marines would land on Taiwanese soil even as the PLA Navy encircled the island from all sides, i.e., before Taiwan’s allies and partners could step in. At least one analyst did not rule out the possibility of China using saboteurs, and the use of a potential fifth column in Taiwan, including within its military, at the time of the military operations. The government-controlled media may be ordered to behave normally in the run up to the development, instead of it engaging in the usual loud, noisy sabre-rattling during such occasions.

Equally importantly, China will not be engaging in a visible large scale, weeks- months long build up near Taiwan if or when it decides to invade Taiwan, as Russia did before the start of the Ukraine war that gave the opposition time to take countermeasures. If at all China amasses troops and equipment close to Taiwan, that would be to put pressure on the Taiwanese, among other things, to step back from a potential declaration of independence. Thus, the said regional assessment does not agree with the IISS annual report on Taiwan issue.

U.S.-China relations

A delegate from the Chinese side had questioned whether the Shangri-La Dialogue has served its purpose in the twenty years after its inception, or it was that the platform is used by the U.S. and its allies to further their interests. He added that the topics chosen for discussions often focused on differences rather than cooperation, and divergence rather than convergence. A part of the rather blunt answer it received from the panel was that while it might have been uncomfortable to face a barrage of questions, it was for China to assess whether it has benefitted from the deliberations as the platform was used by the Chinese side for explaining its views (to the high level participants from across the globe). Whether it will have any impact on China’s assertive behaviour in South China Sea or not, nations big and small made it clear that rule of law and freedom of navigation must be respected. The IISS report mentioned above has held that China remains the leading challenge to the existing international order. Answering a Chinese question on AUKUS, U.S. Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin stressed the importance of partnerships to achieve the shared vision of freedom, security and prosperity in the region.

Though the U.S. side asked for a meeting for Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin with his Chinese counterpart Gen. Li Shangfu, it was rejected. The Chinese made it clear that it would not agree to such a meeting so long as the U.S. sanctions on Gen. Li Shangfu continued to be in place. Though both the leaders shook hands at the opening ceremony, it is not known, as this is written, whether they later met informally away from media glare. Leaders like Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese expressed the fear that a breakdown in communications between the U.S. and China may lead to misunderstandings resulting in conflicts. However, in reality, the U.S. and China have not shut down their channels of communications even as both often take tough postures openly. In fact, while the two sides continued their open attacks of each other, there have been a number of bilateral interactions, that too at a very high level. Some of the recent examples are the visit to China by CIA Director William Burns, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan’s meeting with China’s senior most diplomat Wang Yi in Europe, the U.S. ambassador to China Nicholas Burns’ meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang and the arrival of China’s new ambassador to Washington Xie Feng in the U.S. to take up a position that has been lying vacant for months. [To be continued.]

(Based on open sources of information. Views expressed in the article are personal to the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of AICIS.)