China and North Korea have maintained a complex relationship throughout history, characterised by ideological affinity, economic ties and geopolitical considerations. China and North Korea's alliance was initially forged during the Korean War (1950–1953), as China provided critical military support to the latter against the United States and its allies. This conflict laid the foundation for a close and enduring relationship between the two countries. The nuclear cooperation between China and North Korea has been a subject of global concern and speculation for several decades. The relationship between these two countries, particularly in the realm of nuclear technology, has raised questions about proliferation risks, regional stability and global non-proliferation efforts.

China’s role

Multiple studies and media reports by various sources have pointed to China's alleged assistance to North Korea's nuclear programme. While it is important to note that these accusations are often based on intelligence assessments, they have contributed to the concerns raised by the international community. These concerns have been expressed by countries such as the United States, Japan, South Korea, as well as international organisations like the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, China has denied allegations of aiding North Korea's nuclear programme and maintains that it adheres to international non-proliferation commitments.

In fact, as early as in the 1990s, concerns about North Korea's nuclear ambitions began to emerge, raising international alarm. The United States and its allies accused North Korea of pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in violation of international agreements. China, as North Korea's main economic and political ally, played a pivotal role in diplomatic negotiations to address these concerns. The primary concern regarding the nuclear cooperation between China and North Korea revolves around the potential for technology transfers and assistance that could enhance North Korea's nuclear capabilities. These transfers included technical expertise, equipment and the supply of sensitive material used in the development of nuclear weapons or the advancement of North Korea's ballistic missile programme.

North Korea's launch of a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile on 4 July 2017, that was reportedly supported by Chinese technology and expertise, was a direct provocation to the US. There have been indications of Chinese assistance, including the use of WS51200 Chinese transport trucks to mount the North Korean Hwasong-13 and Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missiles. The trucks were imported from China and declared by the North Korean government to be meant for civilian use. However, the trucks were visible in pictures published by North Korean state media in July 2017. The trucks were also on display in 2012–13 military parades, carrying mock-ups of North Korea's intercontinental ballistic missiles.


Undated photo released by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) in Pyongyang, July, 4 2017. KCNAvia REUTERS

In 2017, South Korea's navy managed to salvage entire sections of the booster rocket that put the North Korean Kwangmyongsong-4 satellite into space. The salvage was scrutinised by international weapons experts, who confirmed that many of the components of the rocket as of Chinese make. UN experts attempting to contact the Chinese firm were met with silence. For example, the Chinese company, Shenyang Machine Tools Company allegedly supplied sophisticated machine tools to North Korea in violation of the supplier country's trade control laws. Shenyang Machine Tools also has a long history of cooperation with North Korea, as evidenced by the company receiving a North Korean delegation in October 2013. A report by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) stated that in 2015, Shenyang Machine Tools Company sent out two 6-axis machine tools that had control units and software licences imported from a Western country on the condition that these tools should not be transferred to North Korea. The report further mentioned that the goods were on the lists of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and other control lists.

Pakistan’s role

The bionic warhead design that North Korea employs is also similar to the Pakistani design, which in turn, is associated with China. It assessed that Chinese technology might have been originally given to North Korea, which fabricated the new warhead that was tested by Pakistan on its Ababeel missile. In 2000, the United States shared the evidence of centrifuge trading between Pakistan and North Korea with Pakistani leader Pervez Musharraf, who conveniently pinned all the blame on Dr A.Q. Khan. By June 2002, US intelligence analysts had confirmed that Pakistan was the source of Pyongyang’s secret uranium enrichment programme who provided them with centrifuges. In 2004, Dr A.Q. Khan signed a detailed confession admitting that during the previous 15 years [up to that date], he provided Iran, North Korea and Libya with the designs and technology to produce the fuel for nuclear weapons. However, Pakistan claimed that rogue scientists with "ambition or greed" [and not any government agencies] were behind the nuclear proliferation. But, scientific community in general opined that was improbable because technology as sophisticated and well-guarded as nuclear weapons technology could not be traded without the knowledge of the governments concerned. In a nutshell, the similarities between North Korean and Chinese designs, as well as the abovementioned confession of Dr A.Q. Khan, among other things, are undeniable evidences that point to the North Korea-China, North Korea-Pakistan clandestine nuclear/missile cooperation.

(Author is a student of international relations and political science. Views expressed in the article are personal to the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of AICIS.)