By Madhav Menon 
Perhaps one of the main objectives of the deployment of so many PLAN vessels in the IOR is to normalise the Chinese presence in the region, both when it comes to the ability of PLAN to deploy vessels far away from its immediate coastlines, and to also systematically chip away any hesitation countries might have about Chinese deployments through frequent deployment and docking requests.
In another episode that may once again complicate relations between India and Sri Lanka, Chinese survey vessel, Shi Yan 6, has requested permission from Colombo to survey the waters around the country, including docking at Colombo. Subsequently, reports emerged from Sri Lankan local media on 20 September 2023 that Sri Lanka has given permission for the vessel to be docked in Colombo. However, India is not the only country to have expressed apprehensions over the supposed visit by the Chinese vessel as US Under Secretary for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland also raised concerns with Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister Ali Sabry about the upcoming visit.
The research vessel is expected to remain in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) for nearly 80 days, conducting joint oceanography, marine geology, and marine ecology tests with Sri Lanka's National Aquatic Resources Research and Development Agency (NARA). This is not the first time the Chinese have requested a ship be docked in Colombo. Last August, Yuan Wang 5, a Chinese ballistic missile and satellite tracking ship, arrived in Hambantota Port, eliciting a strong response from India. There were concerns from India that the ship would be used to conduct surveillance as it has the equipment to eavesdrop on defence and strategic assets in its 750-kilometre radius, which includes six Indian ports, military installations and several nuclear facilities.
Normalising Chinese deployments
The Chinese have also been making frequent visits to Sri Lanka with its naval assets. On 10 August 2023, a People Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessel, Hai Yang 24 Hao, arrived at Colombo Port for a formal visit, scheduled to dock until August 12. Sri Lanka had stated that the visit was approved as per diplomatic protocols and that there were no concerns provided by India.
Perhaps one of the main objectives of the deployment of so many PLAN vessels in the IOR is to normalise the Chinese presence in the region, both when it comes to the ability of PLAN to deploy vessels far away from its immediate coastlines, and to also systematically chip away any hesitation countries might have about Chinese deployments through frequent deployment and docking requests. Other stakeholders might be able to delay the Chinese deployments by a few weeks or months, but eventually the Chinese will have enough leverage on Sri Lanka to force it to submit. Both India and China are important partners for Sri Lanka to restructure its external debt; however, out of the $7.1 billion that Sri Lanka owes to external creditors, $3 billion goes to China.
The Chinese have also, over the past decade, been setting up the infrastructure and building ports in the IOR to allow the PLAN to sustain its operations in the region indefinitely without the need to go back to mainland China. The Chinese have deployed 120 warships in the IOR since 2008 under the guise of anti-piracy operations, according to the Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses. This also includes the deployment of nuclear submarines in 2015, which have no role to play in 'anti-piracy' operations.
The naval base expansion and control of the sea route
The Chinese have also been developing two naval bases in Djibouti and Gwadar in order to assert their dominance in the IOR. The first Chinese naval base in Djibouti has 2000 combat-ready Chinese soldiers and an aircraft carrier pier. A US Department of Defence report states that China may be planning for additional military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces projections in Djibouti. The Gwadar Port, meanwhile, is under total Chinese control, while the Chinese are looking to get a third naval base in Mauritius, the Chagos Islands, in return for the debt to that country being written off.
The development of these naval bases at these three locations could complicate matters for the Indian Navy, as Indian Navy ships would be under constant surveillance and tracking from ships based from these locations. This also allows the Chinese to assist the Pakistanis in tracking and surveillance of Indian assets in the IOR. Any military conflict between India and Pakistan could also be complicated if Chinese surveillance and tracking units start assisting Pakistan's naval and land-based missile platforms, allowing the Chinese to both interfere in case of a war but also use plausible deniability if accused.
If the Chinese naval base in Mauritius is approved, it could have a naval base setup there within a span of 15-18 months, as evidenced by the naval base in Djibouti, whose construction started in March 2016 and was completed by July 2017. The three naval bases could monitor and effect the movement of freight that goes through the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb that connects to Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz, and the base in Mauritius could monitor movements on the European-Indian/Cape Route. The Chinese with these naval bases will allow the PLAN to have area-domination patrols in the IOR throughout the year while also creating leverage in case Malacca is blockaded.
(The author, a keen observer of international developments, has been contributing to several leading portals. Views expressed in the article are personal to the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of AICIS. AICIS is neither responsible nor liable for the accuracy, completeness, suitability, or validity of any information in the article.)