By Dr. Vishal Singh Bhadauriya 
According to the acclaimed Sinologist Andrew J. Nathan, the influence of internal issues in China is intertwined with a broader framework including regional aspirations, strategic considerations, and a long-term objective of achieving global supremacy. Therefore, while the concept of the "Diversionary War Myth" provides insight into certain aspects of Sino-Indian relations, a comprehensive understanding requires a more nuanced analysis that takes into account other factors such as historical, strategic, and political influences that form this crucial bilateral relationship.
The realm of India-China diplomacy is a complex and intricate display of geopolitical manoeuvres reflecting the interconnected desires, weaknesses, and strategic necessities of two prominent powers in the international arena. As these Asian nations engage in regional dynamics, it becomes evident that their relations extend beyond territorial disputes. At a deeper level, there exists a complex interaction influenced by domestic political environments, socio-cultural nuances, and wider conceptions of global dominance.
The "Chinese Diversionary War Myth" has a prominent position within this complex tapestry. This idea, which has its foundations in strategic analysis and is supported by prominent academics such as Jack S. Levy, contends that leaders often use external disputes as a means to divert attention from internal discord. The theory posits that in times of domestic challenges, China may intentionally escalate hostilities with neighbouring Asian nations, particularly India, as well as other countries on its peripheries, with the aim of strengthening internal cohesion and diverting the attention of its population.
In his influential study on the diversionary theory of war, Levy highlights the role of internal political obstacles in driving governments, especially autocratic regimes, to engage in overseas wars as a strategy to consolidate home support. China's actions, particularly during periods of domestic socio-political upheaval, seem to reflect this pattern. The historical conflicts between India and this country, when considered with its internal dynamics, provide a rich context for researchers to examine and evaluate the validity of this theory, while also allowing for potential disagreements and debates.
Nevertheless, it would be an oversimplification to ascribe every hostile action by China only to this notion. According to the acclaimed Sinologist Andrew J. Nathan, the influence of internal issues in China is intertwined with a broader framework including regional aspirations, strategic considerations, and a long-term objective of achieving global supremacy. Therefore, while the concept of the "Diversionary War Myth" provides insight into certain aspects of Sino-Indian relations, a comprehensive understanding requires a more nuanced analysis that takes into account other factors such as historical, strategic, and political influences that form this crucial bilateral relationship.
Historical Underpinnings of the Diversionary War Theory
The adverse consequences of the 'Great Leap Forward', an ambitious economic and social initiative spearheaded by Mao Zedong, had far-reaching effects in China, manifesting as a severe famine and significant economic hardship. The catastrophic event that impacted a vast number of individuals was not alone an economic debacle, but rather, significantly, a failure in the realm of politics. The India-China War of 1962, taking place within this period of turmoil, had a significant role in altering the prevailing narrative. Amid global observation, a swift military altercation resulted in a decisive triumph for China. From a diversionary standpoint, the war gave the embattled Communist Party a necessary respite from internal critiques. The rapid success achieved by the Party in the Himalayas briefly concealed its internal shortcomings, enabling it to reaffirm its authority and control at a period when its legitimacy was under intense examination.
Nevertheless, the diversionary war idea is not limited to the Sino-Indian setting alone. The late 1960s provided an additional possibility. During the Cultural Revolution, a socio-political movement characterised by significant societal disruption and purges, China experienced a period of considerable vulnerability, probably representing one of its most precarious phases in the 20th century. The military clashes that occurred along the Ussuri River in 1969 with the Soviet Union introduced a fresh external narrative. The border skirmishes, though brief, had considerable significance. Through its defiance of the USSR, a fellow communist superpower, China conveyed a resolute stance not only to its populace but also to the global community, affirming its unwavering commitment despite internal disturbances.
The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War serves to reinforce the notion that China used overseas crises as a means of diversionary tactics. The brief but intense conflict ensued immediately after the conclusion of the Cultural Revolution. The official posture of the Chinese government was characterised by a punitive approach, which may be seen as a response to Vietnam's treatment of ethnic Chinese and its invasion of Cambodia. However, it is important to acknowledge the fortuitous timing of these events. The conflict provided a means to redirect the collective narrative of China, as the country continued to grapple with the lingering consequences of the Cultural Revolution on its internal socio-political structure.
The incident involving Sumdorong Chu in 1987, concerning India, is an additional episode within this overarching storyline. During China's process of implementing economic reforms, which included transitioning from a command economy to a market-oriented one, an event took place. The escalation of tensions resulted in a prolonged standoff that lasted for many years, despite the successful prevention of armed conflict. The instability that ensued prior to the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations serves as another evidence of the tendency for foreign conflicts or tensions to precede or coincide with substantial internal issues in China.
Although the diversionary war theory presents a persuasive framework, it is essential to use prudence when engaging with it. It is important to maintain a harmonious equilibrium between these studies and a comprehensive comprehension of the wider geopolitical frameworks. Conflicts seldom arise only from one reason. The influence of internal constraints on China's exterior postures is undeniable. However, it is important to acknowledge that strategic aims, regional hegemony, resource access, and historical legacies all have a significant impact on China's behaviour in the international arena. When examining the intricate web of conflicts centred on China, it becomes evident that domestic issues have the potential to impact China's actions on the global stage. However, it is important to recognise that these challenges are but a single component inside the complex framework of Chinese foreign policy.
The Modern India-China Theatre: Doklam, Galwan, and the Shadows of Xi and Modi
The Doklam stalemate in 2017 and the Galwan Valley conflict in 2020 are significant events within the ongoing narrative of border tensions between India and China. The Doklam crisis included more than a mere territorial issue, as it involved a multifaceted interaction of leadership narratives. Narendra Modi, who assumed the role of India's prime minister in 2014, has established a reputation as a resolute leader committed to asserting India's worldwide standing. The act of maintaining a firm stance in the Doklam region served the purpose of not only conveying India's determination to its local populace but also strategically positioned itself on the world stage.
On the other hand, Xi Jinping's perspective on the matter exhibited a comparable level of complexity. In 2017, Xi Jinping was making preparations for his second term as well as consolidating his control over the Chinese Communist Party. The imminent occurrence of the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party has significant importance within the political landscape of China. In light of the aforementioned circumstances, the Doklam impasse presented a favourable occasion for Xi to demonstrate his assertiveness, not only to India and the global community at large, but also to his domestic audience, therefore reinforcing his reputation as a steadfast protector of Chinese territorial sovereignty.
In the year 2020, the global community found itself among the COVID-19 pandemic, which posed significant and unparalleled problems to several economies, including that of China. The pandemic's first outbreak occurred in Wuhan, China, prompting the Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of Xi to strategically shift the focus away from its early management of the virus towards highlighting the following recovery efforts and aid provided to other nations. Nevertheless, given the increasing worldwide attention and criticism, it was almost expected that there would be an external distraction, as seen from the standpoint of diversionary theory.
In the middle of a worldwide health crisis, the two most populous countries on Earth found themselves in conflict once again. Xi Jinping, amidst speculations of a potential third term and confronted with an economic slowdown, had additional incentives. Although engaging in a full-scale battle with India would be tactically impractical, a constrained altercation serves many objectives: it reaffirms China's territorial claims, demonstrates power to a local constituency, and offers a temporary distraction from internal difficulties and criticisms. Narendra Modi faced internal pressures stemming from the economic repercussions of the epidemic and the complexities associated with addressing the health crisis. In response to the Galwan issue, he used a strategic approach that included elements of caution and determination, effectively handling the necessity of de-escalation while simultaneously upholding national pride.
(The author is a student of History, Department of History, Banaras Hindu University. Views expressed in the article are personal to the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of AICIS. AICIS is neither responsible nor liable for the accuracy, completeness, suitability, or validity of any information in the article. Email: [email protected])